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In  thls  paper  we lnvestl-gate  policies  for  the  large  and
snall  country  that  provide  complete  insulatiot  fron  forelgn  real
and monetary  dlsturbances.  We fl-nd  that  when there  exlsls  two
channels  of  transmission,  the  lntegrated  connodity  and  capltal
markets,  uslng  only  exchange rate  polLcies  does  not  provlde
conplete  lnsulatlon.  Ilowever,  floatlng  the  exchange  rate  and
pursulng  a  specific  interes!  rate  target  does.  In  terns  of
output  rariablllty  however,  tnsulatlng  pollcles  nay  be
undeslrable.INSULATING POLICIES FOR  LAREE AND SMAL].  COUNTRIES
by
l,l.  Ilichael,  Cox
Douglas  l'lcTaggart
l.  InEroductlon
Drrlng  the  era  of  flxed  exchange rates  lt  was generally  felt  that  a
movement to  fl.exible  exchange rates  would  reduee  the  lnternatlonal
transmLsslon  of  disturbances  and allow  countrles  to  pursue  oore
lndependent  monetary  pollcles.  Experlence  wlth  flexlble  rates  since
1973,  however,  has  indlcated  llttle  percePtlble  change in  the  degree  of
cross-country  correlatlon  ln  real  economic activiEyl  and has  led  to  a
uore  eclectic  approach  to  the  questton  of  optlmal  exchange managenent.
Ttre apparent  failure  of  flexible  rates  to  provide  adequate  lnsulatlon  uay
have  strengthened  the  case  for  actlvi-st  exchange fiarket  intervention
potlcies.2  fhis  paper  lnvesllgates  pollcles  that  do  provlde  complete
lnsulatlon  for  large  open econornles.  t.le focus  on a  coublnatlon  of
lnterest  rate  rules  and exchange  rate  rules  lhat  lnsulates  a  country  from
both  the  aystenatlc  and anticiPated  components of  forelgn  nonetary  Pollcy
and  fron  unantlclpated  forelgn  real  and r0onetary  shocks.
ltre  Paper  exanines  a  two-country  world  where  each  country  is
nodelled  in  the  rational  expectatlons  aggregate  supply-aggregate  dex0and
franework  (essentially  an extended MundeII  (1968)-Flening  (1962) model)
that  has  becone popular  for  exchange  rate  analyses  ln  rhe  small  open
e.o.,o.y.3  The modeL analyzes  Ehe transnission  of  disturbances  fron  the
home country  to  the  forelgn  country  as well  as  the  standard  transnlsslon
effect  froE  the  forelgn  to  the  hoDe econony.  The central  bank Policles1
coneldered  lnclude  exchange rate  rules--fixed,  freely  floatlng  and
nanaged exchange  rates--and  interest  rate  ruIes.  T!'o types  of  lnterest.
rate  rules  are  analyzed--pegglng  to  a  forelgn  {nterest  rate  target  or
to  a flxed  donestic  lnterest  rate  target.
The maJor  conclusions  reached  are  as  follows.  Exchange rate
uanagement alone  la  capable  of  ellmlnat.ing  the  transnission  of  either
real  or  monetary  disurbances  but  lncapable  of  slmultaneously
ellnlnatlng  both.  A pollcy  whlch  floats  the  exchange  rate  and nanages
the  lnteres!  rate  Ls  capable  of  ellnlnatlng  the  transmLsslon  of  both
types  of  dlsturbances.  The foreign  central  bank nay  at  the  eaBe tlEe
pursue  such  a  pollcy  and ellminaie  the  transulsslon  of  hone nonetary
and real  dlscurbances  and horoe  inflation  to  the  foreign  country.  In
other  words,  flexlble  exchange rates  comblned wlth  an  lnterest  rate
rule  ln  each  country  ls  a  feaslble  Jolnt  policy  conblnatlon  whlch
provldes  monetary  autonomy and ellx0lnates  the  transnisalon  of
systematlc  and unantlcipaEed  dlsturbances  worldwide.
In  general,  however,  lt  wllL  not  be  optlmal  for  the  central  bank
to  pursue  a  pol-lcy  of  insulatlng  the  home economy fron  forelgn  and real
dlsturbances.  Under most  clrcumstances  euch  a  po1lcy  increase€  the
variablll-ty  of  prlces  and output  ln  excess  of  that.  generated  under o
floatlng  exchange and  lnterest  rate  policy.  Only  when there  are  no
monetary  shocks  and solely  real  dlsturbances  does  the  pollcy  that
ellminates  the  transmission  of  foreign  disturbance  provlde  a  lower
varlance  of  output  than  the  oLher  pollcies  consldered.J
Ttre lntuilion  behind  these  resulta  follows  from  the  fact  that  in
an  integrated  trading  world  the  connodlty  marke!  18 Just  as  lmPortan!
as  the  capltal  narket  as  a  condult  for  forelgn  disturbances.  Recent
analyses  that  emphaslze  the  assete  approach  to  exchange rales,  hence
the  role  of  capital  markets'  have  Eended to  obscure  thls  observallon.
It  follows,  therefore,  thaE  the  movenent to  floatlng  ratea  ln  1973 nay
have  been a  ratlonal  reaponse  by  central  banks  co  perceived  iocreasea
ln  the  variance  of  world\tlde  rea1,  not  uonetary,  dlsturbances;  or
perhaps  due  to  increaslng  degrees  of  connodlty  narket  lntegratlon  as
the  Donelary  authorities  attempled  to  minlnize  the  fluctuatlona  ln
thelr  own home output.
Sectlon  2 outlines  the  assumptions  and basLc  seiup  of  the  nodel.
Section  3 postulates  central  bank  behavior  and  lntroducee  the  money
supply  processes  of  the  two  econoules.  In  Section  4 we examlne the
aolullon  of  the  nodel  for  output  and the  price  level  ln  each of  the
econooies.  In  Section  5 a  varlety  of  ceDtral  bank  pollcles  are
coneldered  and  thelr  lnplicattone  for  outPut  and  the  price  J.eve1 are
examlned.  Sectlon  6 brlefly  analyses  the  optiEallty  of  various  polieles
and  concluding  coEmenta are  presented  in  Section  7.
2.  The Model
Conelder  Ewo countries  that  Produce  and consume the  same perfecrly
Eubslitutable  good.  Production  occurs  ln  spatlall-y  dlstinct  areaa'  but
ln  the  absence  of  Eransportation  costs  and other  lnpedlnenis  to  trade
we can  conglder  a  slngle  world  market  where  prlces  adjust  to  ensureI!
market  clearlng  period  by  perlod.  Connodlty  arbltrage  wlll  guarantee
that  purchasing  poner  parlty  always  holds.
Worldwide  connodlty  denand  is  aesumed to  consls!  of  a  syatenatlc
component plua  a  part  that  depends on  the  real  rate  of  lnterest.  For
sinpllclty,  we igoore  any  lnfluence  of  aggregate  lncome of  the  denand
for  eonnodltles.
Cotrnodlty  supply  ln  each  of  the  Ewo countrles  follows  rhe  lxcas
(1973)  spectflcation  where  only  unexpected  prlce  dlsturbances  produce
output  movenents.  Flood  (1979)  notes  that  such  a  supply  curve
ls  locornpatlble  wlth  the  "islands  nodel"  but  can be generated  by  a wage
contract  nodel.  Specifically,  in  each  country  the  supply  of  conmodttles
ls  aesumed to  be produced  ln  separate  competlllve  labor  marke!8  lthere
uoney  wages are  pald  ln  units  of  the  hone currency.  The labot  supply
decislon  in  each home rqarket  ls  nade  at  the  beginning  of  the  period  on
the  basis  of  a  conpetltlvely  determlned  contractual  money lrage offered
ln  that  market  and an expected  (end-of-perlod)  conroodlty  prlce  level.
Expected  lncreaaes  in  the  hone prlce  level  are  assuued to  involve
proportional  lncreases  1n  the  hone  contracted  average  money wage so
that  the  hone economy-wlde average  real  wage ls  not  directly  affected
by  an antlclpated  lncrease  ln  the  home prlce  level.  UnantLcipated
price  level  changes lnvolve  a  change tn  the  real  \,rage  not  accounted  for
ln  the  orlglnal  contracE.  Enployers  are  then  free  to  adjust  the  level
of  employnent  according  to  the  change in  the  value  of  lhe  Earglnal"
producE  of  labor  (a  novernent along  the  denand for  labor  curve)  ln  a way
agreed  upon by  workers  who entered  the  contract  at  the  beglnnlng  of  theperlod.  The elope  of  the  supply  curve  la  thus  lntlDately  connected  to
the  speclfi-cation  of  the  countryrs  underlylng  technology  and
contracting  fornula.
Thete  ts  one type  of  bond perfectly  noblLe  worldwide  so  lhat
lnterest  parlty  ls  an equlllbrlum  condltion  of  the  node1.
The  deuand  for  money ln  each  country  is  assumed  to  be
proportionately  related  to  the  coEDodlty  prlce  level,  positlvely
related  to  the  level  of  real  lncone,  and lnversely  related  !o  lhe
noninal- rate  of  interest.4
Ihese  assr.rnptions  are  summarl.zed  in  the  following  model:






(3)  it  = rt  +  Pj.r-1-  -  Pj
(4)  tt"  = yi. + o*(pt  - p1e(t-l);  + el
(s)  Mf" - t*  + Pt + a*Yt - bt'l1
(6)  rt =  .t +  PtitE)  - Pt
(7)  Yr + Yt = \t  - ..s - 
"*.f(8) Pr-Pi+Er
rt=if+n!f!)-r. (e)
Wlth  the  exception  of  lgl  rg,  and yg  all  varLables  are  expressed  1n
logarlthns.  4n  asterisk  denotes  the  forelgn  economy,  t  denotes  the
tlne  perlod  and  the  auperscrlpts  d  anil  s  denote  deuand and  supply
respectively.  The definltions  of  the  varlablee  are:
M = the  nominal  stock  of  money
P =  rhe  prlce  level
Y  =  real-  lncorne
1=  the  nominal  interest  rate
r  =  the  real  lnterest  rate,  and
E = the  exchange rate  = Ehe number of  unl.ta  of  the  home countrv
per  unit  of  the  forelgn  currency.
Equatlons  (l)  and  (4)  are  the  connodlty  supply  relatlong.
Equatlons  (2)  and  (5)  are  rhe  noney  denand funct.lons  nhile  (3)  and.(6)
specify  the  Flsher  equatlons.  WorldwLde connodlty  narket  clearlng
occurs  accordlng  to  equatlon  (7).  Ihe  two  lnternatlonal  abrltrage
condltione  are  the  ppp relatlon  (g)  and  the  interest  parlty  relation
(9).  The variable  )F(t)  represents  the  expectation  of  lhe  varLable  X
condllloned  on  all  information  avallable  at  tlne  perlod  c which
includes  all  varlables  up  to  and  includlng  perlod  t.  I'tre tenqs  et
and el  are  assuued  to  be lndependently  lndentlcally  allsrributed  zero
mean random supply  disturbancee  wlth  variancea  of, ^na  o!*  respectively.For  slnpllclty,  the  money demand parametera  a  and a*  are  set  equal
to  unity.  Without  loss  of  generallty,  we also  asgune that  k = k*  = 0,
c  +  c*  =  I,  and  that  Yrrs =  Y1,  Ant  =  An,  and  Yfig  =  Yl  so  tbat  the
systenatic  parts  of  home and  forelgn  commodity demand and  supply  are
constant  over  time.
3.  The Money Supply  Proceasea
It  remalnG  to  speclfy  the  money supply  processes  of  the  horne  and
forelgn  central  banks.  For  siEplicit.y,  we abstract  from  the  banking
sector  and agsune  lhat  the  money stock  ln  each  country  ls  equal  to  its
monetary  base  nade up  of  eentral  bank  holdings  of  l.nternallonal
reserves  and domesLic  credi!.  the  central  bank  ln  each  country  may
Hant  to  nanage the  exctrange rate.  this  ls  acconrplished  by  purchaslng
or  selling  lnternational  reserves  in  response  !o  devlaElons  of  the
exchange  rate  from  1!s  targe!  value.  In  additlonr  each  cenEral  bank
uay  purgue  an  interest  rate  target.  Thl,s ls  done by  oPen narke.t
purchases  or  sales  of  bonds.  Together  these  pollcies  laPly  the
following  noney supply  processes:5
(  l0)
(r1)
1"11  = pr  + DE(iE-Er)  + rni(lr-ir)  + ur
u{ = p*t -'ftEf-nrl  +'{{il-il>  + pf.
Et  is  lhe  exchange  rate  tafget  and ia  is  the  interest  rate  target  of  the
home central  bank,  p  1s  the  systematlc  grovJth rate  of  the  hooe ooney
supply  and ug  la  an lndependently  ldentlcally  dlstributed  zero  neanU
random disturbance  (an  unantlcipated  hoEe nonetary  shock)  wlth  variance
o[.  The forelgn  vari-ables  are  sinllarly  defined.
The paraneter  mE delermlnes  the  degree  to  whlch  the  tlone  cenlral
bank  supports  the  exchange rate.  For  mg )  0 exchange  rate  pollcy  1n
the  home country  can  be  described  as  leanlng  against  the  w1nd.  As olE
becomee larger  the  exchange rate  beconea progressiveLy  more fixed  1.e.,
lin  Et  -  Ec.  For  ng  =  0 exchange rate  po11cy  ls  freely  fl"oattng.
nE+-
In  general  for  mB rt  0 the  exchange rate  ls  managed (a  dlrty  float).
Sinllarly,  the  paraneEer  ml  measurea the  degree  to  which  the  home
central  bank  targeis  the  hone interest  rate.  For  m1 )  0 horne lnterest
rate  pollcy  ls  leaning  agalnst  the  w-ind 
""U  *1i"" 
lt  =  lt.  By increasing
nl  lhe  hone cent.ral  bank  perrdts  less  devlarlJn  ln  the  houe lnteresg
rate  fron  lts  target  .,alou  ig.  For  n6 *  0 and n1  +  0  the  home central
bank  ls  fo1low1ng  a  "nixed"  pollcy  directed  ln  part  toward  nanaglng  the
exchange  rate  and  ln  part  toward  Eanaging  rhe  interest.  rate.  SlEllar
central  bank  behavlor  ls  presumed for  the  forelgn  economy.
The target  exchange rate  of  the  home econony ls  assuned  to  be
(12)  tg -  Eo  + nt
where  n  1s  the  selected  rate  of  growth  of  the  target  exchange rate  ln
the  houe  country  and  Eo l-s  the  base  value  of  the  target.  Sinllarly  for
the  forelga  country
(13)  il  - nl + 1*t.9
Tvo targets  for  the  lnterest.  rate  should  be  consldered.  These are:
(1)  a ftxed  lnterest  rate  target  (it  = i,  it  = i*1,  antl (tl)  a foreign
i.nterest  rate  target  (tr  = lt,  tt  = fr).  It  1s easy ro  show  rhat
targetlng  the  houe lnterest  rat.e  to  the  forelgn  interest  rate  ls  pollcy
equlvalent  to  managing lhe  exchanBe rate.  Thls  ls  because  the  interest
parlly  conditlon  dlrectly  relatea  devlatlons  of  11 frou  1l  to  devlatlons
of  E;ii'fron  Eg whlch  are  dlrect.l-y  relat.eal  Eo tE.  In  view  of  rhls,  rhe
case  of  a  forelgn  lnterest.  rale  target  l_s not  taken  up  further  here.
In  chooslng  a  fixed  target  for  the  norulnal  interesf  rate  we requlre
that  the  target  be achievable  by  the  approprlate  selection  of  rhe
parameter  mi.  Since  ie(t-l)  -  I  *  r,,r  where  I  is  the  expected  or
aystexnaric rare  of  lnflarlon  (ptfi-l)  -  re(t-l),  and rn  Ls rhe narurar
rate  of  lntereat  ln  the  hox0e  country  (that  rate  whlch  ex  ante  clears  the
lrorld  conuodity  rnarket),  for  n1  = (! lt  nust  be  true  that  T  =  r  + rn,  i.e.
a  nomlnal  interest  rate  target  cannot  be chosen  independently  of  the
expected  equillbrtun  rate  of  lnflatlon.  In  general  (speclfically,  except
under  flxed  exchange rates)  Ehere  ls  freedon  of  cholce  regarding  the
value  for  r  and therefore  T.  Slnilarly,  F  roust be  chosen  conpatlble
with r*  gtven rfi.
4.  Solution  of  the  Model
In  obtalnlng  solutions  for  home and forelgn  output,  the
price  level,  and other  variables  of  interest  It  is  helpful  to  make use of
e(t-l)
the  deflnltlon  Xg =  Xg' 
'+ 
Xt  nhere  Xt  ia  lhe  unanticipated  component
at  Xt  and  is  orthogonal  to  x!(t-f).  Thls  and  the  linear  etructure  ofl0
the  nodel  allolts  the  solutlon  for  each variable  to  be  obtaLned  in  two
separate  parta--a  Bystematic  part  and an unantlclpated  part--thereby
slupllfylng  the  solullon  teehnique.6  This  ylelds  solutlons  for  the
donesllc  and foreign  prlce  leve1,
(14)  j.  = *o + K1t  + Kzl + K::r
,*
where Pg =  [Ps Pllr
-  *-*  -  tt  * = [E0  lEO1],  ni=  [et ut er ut] T
l-nr,,o*rr,.o+r)  - Ynl
*o = 
| <r-nll[(b+rl)(rnnr)  -
t_
* <r-nrl<o*-'fin*)  I
rrEn)  + ni(e*-xn;n*)_l
| 
-n!f  r*ur-11-n3(b*tui)
n  o 
| -n1{  r*o*i)-rr2(b*rni)
t_
+ (  l-II1) t  (b*+fig)  (rrr+n*  1
trl  + nlI  tu*r*i)(.rr*n*)
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IIz = (1+o)(r+b+o1)  + rnB  nl = (t+o*)(t+b*hi)  + n;
II3=nB-e*1Ur-1)
n4=(n2n;-n3n!1-t,
-  *  ^,,*.  *.
.ll3 = EE -  U\D +|tri.,
and where T  is  the  vector  of  target  values  and  1g in  the  vector  of
dlsturbances.
It  1€ evldenf  that  the  systenatic  and  the  unanticipated  conponenta  of
Ehe price  level  l-n each  country  depend on  the  Bystenatlc  and unanticlpated
coEponents  of  pollcy  ln  both  countrles.  thls  lnt.erdependence  nakes  the
choice  of  pollcy  a very  conplLcated  and possibly  strateglc  gane for  the
central  banks.
From equations  (14)  we have  that
(r5)  n = [1(prrsn)  + (r-11l)(p*-oin*), 
"rra
* (16)  r" = nf(p*{fn*) + (r-ni)(p+osn),
for  all  t.
Using  lln  II  = 0,  lln  IIi  -  1,  Iin  II1 =  1,  .tr6




verifles  that,  except  under  a hone  central  bank  pollcy  of  flxed  exchange
ratea,  the  home central  bank  ls  free  to  select  the  home lnterest  rate
target  (f)  by  choice  of  the  hone money grolrth  rate  (p)  and target  ratet2
of  exchange  rate  growth  (n).  Unaer a  forelgn  central  bank  policy  of
flxed  exchange  rates  (nfi  t  -1  n  equals  p + nEn hence  the  hoDe central
bank  ls  free  to  target  the  hoEe lnterest  rate;  hoeever  n*  equals  I  and
the  forelgn  central  bank  looses  Lts  ablltty  to  target  Ehe forelgn
lnterest  rale.
Solvlng  for  the  horne  nonlnal  lnterest  rate  yle1d6
(17)  1r = rn+n  + aler + a2uc  + o3.l * oar!
where
al = -[(l+e)klt  + 0*k2l  + 1]
aZ=-[(l+0)kr2+e*k221
03  = -[(I+0)k13  + g*k22  + l]
a4=-[(I+e)kr4+e*k241
and  where  ktj  ls  an  element  of  the  natrlx  K3.  Taking  the  lfinlt  ae
n1  +  .o givee  1ln  la  =  rn  -t-  n  so  that  a  central  bank  potlcy  of  flxing
ml+o
the  nonlnal  lnterest  rate  wiEh  target  T  E rn  +  T in  1n  fact  achievable.
We can  slmilarly  solve  for  the  equllibriun  exchange  rate  .
5.  Exchange Rate  and  Interest  Rate  policy
In  thls  section  we focus  on  exchange rate  and lntereat  rate  pollcies
and  the  lnternatl-onal  transmi6slon  of  dLsturbances.  Of  interest  are
the  lnplicatlons  of  lndependenE exchange rate  and lnteres!  rate  policles
on  the  part  of  each  central  bank and  the  lnpllcatlons  of  coordinatedI3
pollcy.  In  the  splrlt  of  pollcy  discusslons  pre-1973  (i.e.,  before  the
complete  breakdown of  the  Bretton-Woods  syscen),  the  goal  of  the  central
bank  in  each  country  is  presumed to  be to  reduce  the  lnEernational
transnisalon  of  dig turbances-boEh  Eonetary  and real--to  that  country  and
to  puraue  a nore  lndependent  monetary  policy.  For  the  home central  bank
pursult  of  thl8  goal, lnvolvee  the  selection  of  the  lnterest  rate
managenent parameter  (nl),  the  exehange rafe  nanagement parameter  (ng)r
the  larget  rate  of  exchange rate  grorth  (n),  and  the  rate  of  home  noney
growth  (p).  The forelgn  country  chooses rl,  ri,  1*, 
"rrd 
p*  ln  t
slnllar  splrlt.
5. I  -g*"h*g".  Rate  Pollcies
Consider  pure  exchange  rate  pollcies  lrhere  the  central  bank  floats
the  lnteres!  rate  (n1  *  0)  buE nanages  the  exchange  rate.  For  fixed
exchange  rate6  the  unexpecLed price  shock  in  each  councry  ls  equal
--***.******
(Pt  = Pt)  and equal  Eo -(ll2-ll3)-t[(b  +n1)es +  (1+b + rni)eg -  u1l.
Sinilarly,  the  antlclpated  rate  of  inflatlon  Ln each  country  ls  equal
(r=r*)  and  equal  to  1p*nf;n*).  under  flxed  exchange rates,  therefore,
home oucput  ls  open to  forelgn  real  and monetary  shocks  and lhe  hone
lnflation  rate  is  open to  systematLc foreign  lnflatlon.  Notice  that
neither  the  home country  monetary  shocks,  ut,  nor  the  hone counlry
parauetera  b  or  e  enter  the  Bolutlon  for  Ehe unexpected  prlce  suprlses.
Thls  ls  becauae hone country  monet.ary ehocke are  totally  overwhelmed by
the  exchange  rate  nanagement practlces  of  1t6  central  bank.  In  other
words,  the  hone country  has  lost  control  of  J-ts rnoney supply.  ltrel4
opposlte  result  nould  arlse  1f  lt  rdere the  forelgn  couolry  fLxlng  the
exchange  rate.  The systematlc  rate  of  lnflation  depends only  on the
acllons  of  the  country  not  given  responslbllity  for  set.tlng  the  exchange
rate.  Under the6e  clrcuastances  lt  ls  unlLkely  that  either  country  w111
be  indlfferent  as  to  who ualntains  the  ftxed  exchange. raie.
For  the  ca6e  of  freely  floatlng  exchange rates  (ng  = ri  =  Ol
l  equals  p  80 that  the  hone  lnflatlon  rate  dependa only  on home noney
growth.  As ls  evldent  fron  (14)  Pl  renatns  dependent  upon
y!  ana  ef.  A freely  floatlng  exchange rate,  therefore,  does not  e.l-lmlnate
the  transxlLssl-on  of  either  nonetary  or  real  shocks  to  the  hooe country.T
Sfinllar  results  hold  for  the  foreign  couotry.
As noted  above pure  exchange rate  pollcLe8  are  not  capable  of
si.multaneously  elininating  the  transnlssion  of  both  real  and monetary
forelgn  disturbances.  However,  the  ellmlnatlon  of  one of  the  shocks  nay
be  achleved  by  an appropriate  dlrty  f1oat.  For  exauple,  by  settlng  ni  =  0
and rnp =  O*b transdtsslon  of  foreign  money shocks  Ls  ellmLnated,  but
the  lnfluence  of  forelgn  real  shocks  on hone ouiput  remaina.  This  le  an
exchange  rate  pollcy  of  leanlng  against  the  nlfld.  On the  other  hand,  an
exchange  rate  pollcy  that.  elininates  the  effect  of  forelgn  real  shocks
requlres  an exchange rate  policy  of  leanlng  w1th  the  wlnd.  Speciflcally,
*  **
settlng  nE =  -bIl-r0E(l+b  {f,l)-r]  lnsulates  the  home econony  fron
forelgn  real  shocks  but  penoits  the  influence  of  foreign  monetary  shocks.
Each of  the  above pollcies  ellminates  one source  of  transx0isslon  of
shocks  fron  the  forelgn  country  to  the  hone country  but  neither  is
capable  of  ellulnating  the  transnisslon  of  both  types  of  shoci<s.l)
Moreover,  no  coordlnation  of  pure  exchange xate  pollcles  between the  hone
and  the  foreign  country  (no  conblnatton  of  ug  anil rnf;  for  n1  = nf  -  61
1s  capable  of  elinlnatlng  the  transmlsalon  of  both  real  and monetary
shocks  worldwlde.
5.2  Interest  Rate Pollcies
We  now conslder  pure  lnterest  rate  pollcles.  A pure  lntereat  rate
pollcy  ls  a  pollcy  whl-ch lgnores  the  exchange rate  and keys  solely  on  the
lnterest  rate.  Ttre exchange rate  ls  then  freely  floarlng  (rnn =  0).
Fron  (14)  lt  le  clear  that  aetting  nE =  0 glves  II3 =  on(rt  +  b)  anal
so  by  selecti.ng  r01 =  -b  the  solutlon  for  Ehe unantl-clpated  part  of  the
home prlce  level  is
(i8)  Pr = (ut-Er)(l+e)-I.
In  this  way the  lnfluence  of  both  donetary  and real  forelgn  shocks  on  the
hone  prlce  Level  and home output  1s  ellnlnated.  Fron  (15)  (and  the
dlscusslon  of  flextble  exchange rates),  settlng  ng  equal  to  zero
ylelds  n  = p  so  that  a poliey  of  u1  =  -b  and ng  =  0 ellml-nages  the
transolEslon  of  systemaiic  and unanticipaced  foreign  real  and noneEary
disturbances  to  Ehe home country.  Moreover  hone output  and the  home
price  level  are  independent  of  the  behayior  of  the  forelgn  central  bank
so  that  regardless  of  forelgn  poltcy  (fixed  exchange  rates,  flexlble
exchange  rates,  dlrty  float,  an lnterest  rate  rule)  the  home econony 1s
conpletely  lnsulated  fron  forelgn  events.It  follows  that  the  foreign  central  bank rnay choose rnf =  0 antl
ni  =  -b*tttd  ellnlnate  any  lmpacE of  hone roonetary  and real  dlsrurbances
and  hone  cengral  bank  behavlor  on  the  forelgn  econony.  Therefore,
without  the  need  for  coordinatlon,  flexible  exchange  rates  conblned  wlth
an  lncerest  race  rule  Ln each  country  ls  a  feaslble  poll.cy  conblnatlon
whlch  provldes  Donetary  autonomy and elLmlnate6  the  transnlsslon  of
sys lematlc  and unantlclpated  dlsturbances  krorldwj-de.
Conslder  rnore closely  the  lnteresE  rate  rule  descrlbed  above.  For
nl  =  -b  and  u6  =  0  the  hone  rnoney supply  process  ls
(19)  Mr  = pr - b(lr-T) + ur.
When the  hone interest  rate  falls  below  its  target  value  the  home central
bank  increases  Ehe hoEe rnoney supply  by  an amount exactLy  equal  to  the
lncrease  ln  hone  rnoney demand.  Ihis  ls  a  pollcy  of  leanlng  rdlth  the  wlnd
and may be approprlately  terned  acconmodatlve  slnce  the  hoEe central  bank
accomnodates interes  t -rate-induced  changes itr  the  denand for  noney.  By
following  thls  policy  lhe  hone central  bank  restores  monetary  equlllbrlun
in  the  hone country  wlthouc  an unanlicipated  change 1n the  hone prlce
leveI.
5.3  Transnlsslon  Channels
It  ls  eviden!  that  a  policy  of  flxlng  the  exchange rate  and floatlng
the  lncerest  rate  cannot  inEulate  the  hoxne  econony  fron  forelgn  shocks
whereas  a  policy  of  floatlng  the  exchange rate  wh1le  Eanaging  lhe
lnterest  rate  can.  The reason  for  thls  result  lles  ln  the  nature  of  thet7
llnkages  through  whlch  dlsturbancea  are  transnitted  frou  one econony  to
the  others.  These llnkages  are  the  lntegrated  goods market  and the
lntegrated  capltal  market.  Real  disturbances  are  tranax0itted  dlrectly
through  the  good8 market  via  their  effect  on  output  supplles  becauae of
coromodily arbitrage  and  then  indlrectly  through  the  ca.pital  market  vla
lnduced  prlce  and  lnterbs!  rate  changes aa ouEpu!  changes.  |lonetary
dLsturbances  have  direct  interest  rate  effecEs  transnltted  through
capltal  marketE  because of  the  assunptlon  of  interes!  rate  parity  and
lndlrect  output  effects  vla  induced  unanticlpated.  prlce  suprlses.  To
lnsulate  an econony thus  requlres  closlng  the  above  thro channels.  A
flexlble  exchange rate  breaks  the  llnk  between  foreign  and donestlc
prices  and  so  closes  Che goods narket  channel.  A nanaged lnterest  rate
breaka  rhe  link  beEween forelgn  and domestic  intereat  rates  as  long  as
the  exchange rate  is  floatlng.
In  other  words,  because real  dlsturbances  are  transnitted  prlnarl.ly
through  the  goods market  while  monetary  dlsturbances  are  trananltted
prlnarlly  through  the  capital  market,  exchange rate  pollcy  should  be
dlrected  to  real  dLsturbances  wlth  lnterest  rate  policy  dlrected  to
monetary dlsturbances.
6.  Optinal  Pollcles
To th16  point  we have  only  been concerned  wiih  central  bank  polictes
that  can  be  used  to  reduce  the  transnisslon  of  dlsturbances.  A pollcy
capable  of  ellnlnatlng  the  lafluence  of  both  real  and rnonetary  foreign
dlsturbances  1g one of  floatlng  the  exchange rate  and  pursuing  a  ',leaning
Itlth  the  htlnd"  interest  rate  pollcy.  It  remains  to  be verifled  that  ther8
central  bank would  want  to  pursue  such  a  pollcy  accordlng  to  an optioality
criterlon  other  than  slnply  achievlng  laternatlonal  independence.  At
queotion  here  is  whether  or  not  the  pursult  of  lndependent  pollcles,  such
as  att.enpted  followlng  lhe  BretLon-Woods breakdown,  entalled  hldden  or
unantlclpated  coat s.
A reasonable  crlterlon  by  whlch  ro  Judge  the  effecls  of  differen!
polleies  ls  ln  terms  of  the  varLance  of  output..  A po1lcy  wlll  be Judged
nore  desirable  lf  lt  lowerg  the  vartance  of  output,  given  the  po11cy
decleion  of  the  forelgn  ceniral  bank.  Because of  the  lnterdependence  of
the  two  econonlea,  optinal  central  bank  pollcy  1s  gane straEeglc  ln  nature
and  a  dlscusslon  of  fu11y  optimal  pollcies  would  require  a  complete
descriptlon  of  the  gane belng  played  and an  appropriate  deflnltlon  of
equlllbrlun.  For  the  purposes  of  this  paper  we ask  a  sfunpler
questlon--given  flxed  forelgn  central  bank  behavlor  which  of  the  followlng
pollcles  produces  the  snallest  domeetlc  ouLput  varlance?  Choices  are
llmired  Eo a  purely  floatlng  exchange rate,  a  fLoatlng  exchange rate  wlth
a  fixed  lnterest  rate,  a  floating  exchange rate  with  a managed lnterest
rate  (the  tnsulating  pollcy)  and a  fixed  exchange  late  wirh  a  floatlng
lntereat  rate  pollcy.
The forelgn  central  bank ls  assuned to  do nothlng,  1.e.,  it  sets
(nt  = nf  -  01.  U61ng  (l)  and (15) we can derive
(20)  Yt -  Yn  + 11ej *.r2us + .y3e[  + r+utr
nhere  the  yj  are  eonplicated  expressions  lnvolvlng  0,  0*,  b,  b*  and  the
Pollcy  paraoeters.  Ilowever,  settlng  rf  = ri  -  0 anil  eelecting  thel9
approprlate  values  for  mE and mi  we have  ln  Table  I  the  values  of  11
-  correspondlng  to  the  different  pollcles.  Using  (20)  we have
zz  22*  2 (21)  var(Ys)  = 1fo.-  + 1iofr  + 1io-" +.y4oi*.
Because of  the  conplexlty  of  parameters  yl  as  function8  of  the
underlying  structural  paraneters  lt  16 dlfficult  to  conpare  varlances  for
unspeclfied  values  of  O,  e*,  b  and b*.  In  order  to  get  uaeful  lesulta  we
nueericalLy  calculated  the  value  of  Var(Yj)  for  a  range  of  reasonable
values  of  the  BtrucEural  paraneters  and for  dlfferent  sl-ze varlanceg
,-
oil  x  = e,  y  e*  and g*.  A broad range of  "reasonable  values"  for
e,  e*,  b  and  b*  was considered.S  Although  we failed  to  flnd  unamblguous
results,  tbe  following  conslstent  patterns  emerged from  the  cal-culatlons.
1)  ihder  moat  clrcumstances  a  purely  floatlng  exchange  rate  and
lnterest  rate  (a  non-lnterventlonl8t  pollcy)  ylelded  Ehe lowest  outpu!
variance.
11)  Al-so under  mo6t  clrcunstances  Ehe conpletely  lnsulating  pollcy,
ylelded  the  hlghest  output  varlance.  In  many cases  a  flxed  exchange rate
policy  conpeted  nith  the  lnsulatlng  pollcy  for  the  highest  output  varlance
wlth  neLther  conpletely  donlnating  the  other.
lii)  I,Ihen  there  were  only  real  shocks  <o2.  =  t2.* >  0,  o3 =  ol*  =  O)
the  lnsul,atlng  pollcy  ylelded  the  lowest  output  variance.
iv)  tJhen  there were  only nonetary shocks  (ofi = oi,t> 0,  o! = o!*  = ol
a  fixed  exchange  rate  yielded  the  lowest  output  varlance.zo
TASLE I
FloatlngE(uf=0) Flxed  E
(mg=o,  p1 -1
FloatLng  i  Targeted  I  Flxed  I
Parauetera  (ni=o) (n1  = -;  (n1  = -5;
yl  k1(l+e*)(t+b'r)  k2(r+e*;q1+6*;  k3(t+0*)(t+b*)  k4t(t+b)(r+b*)(l+o,t)
\200k30(l+e;r)(l+brr)k40(l+e't;11a6*1
Y3  -klo(r+b't)  -k2o(r+b'r)  0  -k40b(  l+b*)
Y4  kt€  -k2OO*  0  -kaeg*b
where  :
kt  = (I+0,r)(r+b*) + eb,t
kz  = (r+e)(f+o*)(t+u*)  - eo*b*
k3  = (r+€)(r+e*)(t+b*)
k4  = (1+0)(r+0*)(t+b)(1+b*)  - oe*bb*.2L
v)  In  al1  cases,  the  varl_ance of  output  varled  systeDatically  witt
the  slze  of  0,  0*,  b  and b*,  usually  tenaling  to  grow wLth  slze  of  the
paraneters  although  not  unlfornly.
In  general,  lt  appears  that.  whenever  real  dlsturbances  occur  soEe
forrn  of  a  fl,oating  exchange rate  pollcy  is  desLrable,  usually  a  pure
float.  At  the  eame tlme  a  flxed  exchange rate  pollcy  is  always
undesltable  1n  the  presence  of  real  disturbances.  It  is  also  true  tha!  a
poltcy  of  complete  lnsulation  ls  usually  undeslrable  ln  the  preaence  of
monetary  dlsturbances.  The explanatlon  for  these  resulis  is  closely
related  to  the  discusslon  1n  Sectlon  5.3.  Real  shochs work  directly
through  the  gootls market  and so  a  flexlble  exchange rate  pollcy  can at
least  mlnlmize  the  de6tabl1lz1ng  effects  of  foreign  real  shocke.  On the
other  hand,  a  po11cy  of  conplete  lnsulation  at  a  tLme when the  foxelgn
central  bank ls  dolng  nothlng,  means the  hone  econony ls  retalning  it8
oltrr monetary  shocks  whelr lt  could  be  exportlng  chem to  the  forelgn
country.
When there  are  no monetary  shocks  but  only  real  shocks,  an
acconodatlve  monetary  policy  offsetg  the  effects  of  real  dlsturbances
transmltted  by  foreLgn  prices  through  the  capltal  market.  In  thls  ca6e
the  conpl-ete-lnsulatlng  pollcy  does  best.
Flnally,  flxlng  the  exchange rate  i6  best  in  a world  of  only
monetary  shocks  because  the  domeslic  monetary  authority  ls  now able  to
export  nuch  of  its  prlce  varlablllty  to  the  forelgn  economy vla  the  flxed
exchange  rate.22.
These resulta  are  contlngent  oo  the  assunption  tha!  Ehe foreign
central  bank  does  not  respond  to  the  donestlc  pollcy  regime.  If  we gave
t.he forelgn  central  bank  discretlon  over  its  oern  Policy  the  above
resulta  would  llkely  change.
7.  Suunary and  Conclusion
Ib18  paper  consldera  lnteres!  rate  and exchange  rate  manageuenE
policlee  that  reduce  the  lnternat'lonal  transnlgslon  of  dlsturbances  and
allolr  counLries  to  pursue  more lndependent  monetary  pollcles.  Exchange
rate  [anageDent  alone  ls  capable  at  ellminatlng  the  transnission  of
elther  real  or  monetary  shocks  but  not  both.  The ellnlnatlon  of  foreign
nonetary  dlgturbances  requires  an exchange rate  pollcy  of  leaning  against
the  wlnd  whereas  the  elininatlon  of  forelgn  real  disturbances  requltes
leaning  wilh  the  wind.  Each pollcy  Ls  a dirty  float.  An interest  rate
rule,  comblned wlth  a  floating  exchange ratet  however  r  ls  capable  of
elimlnating  the  transmlsslon  of  both  real  and monetary  dlsEurbances.  By
following  an lntereet  rate  po11cy of  leaning  wlth  the  wlnd'  speciflcally
by  accoomodatlng  interest-rate-lnduced  changes la  the  dernand  for  moneyt
the  hooe country  can ellmlnate  the  transnlsalon  of  forelgn  real  and
monetary  ghocks  to  home output,  ag well  as  the  Eransmisslon  of  foreign
lnflation  to  the  home prlce  level.  The forelgn  cenEral  bank nay
slmultaneougly  pursue  such  a  pollcy  and ellninate  the  transmisslon  of
home nonetary  and real  dlsEurbanceg  and hone  inflatlon  to  the  forelgn
coutrtry.
The cost  of  achieving  autonomy,  however,  1111 generally  be  lncreased
price  and  output  variances.  Under most  clrcumstances  a  pollcy  of23
floating  both  the  interest  rate  and  the  exchange rate  x0lnlmlzes  the
varlance  of  output.  Autonomy,  therefore,  is  probably  not  worih  pursulng
for  lts  own sake.
Flnally  we have  provlded  a  partial  explanation  as  to  why central
banks  noved  to  floatlng  rates  ln  the  early  l970rs.  That  move colnclded
wlth  a  perlod  a  large  real  shocks  (prlnarlly  natural.  resource  and
agrlcultural-  shocks  of  the  perlod,  followed  later  by  the  oil  shocks),
.  that  ls  a  perlod  rdhen the  varl-ance  of  real  shocks  inereased  relatlve  to
the  varl.ance  of  monetary  shocks.  As demonstrated  above,  a  flexlble
exchange rate  reglme  usually  does  best  under  the6e  condLtlone  so  that,  in
terns  of  rnininlzing  donestlc  output  fluctuatLonE,  the  move ltas  a  ratlonal
response  to  a  change in  the  lnternatlonal  econoolc  envlronment.24
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FOOTNOTES
lSee  Shafer  and I-oopesko (f983),  Artus  and Young (1979)  and Frenkel
(  r980)  .
2See Golttstein  (f980),  especially  p.  48-54.
3For exanple,  see Barro  (1978),  cox  (1980),  Flood  (1979)t
Klurbrough  (1983),  Saldi  (1980) and Weber (1981)'  amongst others.
4|{.  o".  the  seni-logarlthrnlc  noney  deuand  fono  wlth  a  one  mlnor
Dodificatlon  ln  that  we also  take  the  senl-log  relatlon  of  incorne !o
money denand.  with  thls  rnodl-fi-catlon  the  nodel  in  roade tractable  idhlle
clearly  no  sacrlfice  of  the  cenEral  conclusions  Ls rnade.
5Recently,  Stegel  (1983)  analyzed  interest  rate  rules  for  the  closed
eeonomy.  D,ot6ey and King  (f983)  also  dlscuss  dlfferent  nonetary  Poll-cy
rules,  lncluding  interest  rate  rulesr  for  the  closed  economy.
Goodfriend  (1984) dlscusses  a related  Donetary  rule.
6we rsake considerable  use  of  the  following  two  facts:  (1)  there
exlsts  just  one natural  rate  of  lnterest  (ro)  worldwide  because of  the
lntegrated  goods market,  and  (tl)  the  sl'stenatlc  elementa  inlroduced  lnto
the  noney  aupply  rule  tnply  thaE  4tI-1)  =  P€li'l
7sfu11a.  results  are  derived  by  Flood  (1979)  and  Saldl  (1980)  for
the  BrDall  open  economy.
.8ttre  raoge  of  b  antl b*  considered  was bet\teen  I  and  I0.  A value  of  b
or  b'  between  I  and  l0  lnpltes  an interest  elastlclty  of  the  denand for
money between  0.01  and  0.10.  The values  for  g and  €*  were  catculated
from  Lucas  (1973)  where  hls  calculations  lnply  a  e of  l0.ll  for  the
United  States  ranging  doltn to  0.40  for  Sweden.  The average  O-value  for
14 econoxDics (excludlng  the  unlted  States,  Argentl.nar  Puerto  Rlco  and
Paraguay)  1g  1.73  but  for  only  creat  Britaln'  France  and Gernany 1s
around  5.0